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Ill

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises out of an insurance coverage dispute. Appellant ABK, LLC ("ABK")

operates a gas station in Post Falls, Idaho. In the winter of 2016/2017-a memorable timeframe
oft-referred to as Snowmageddon-water infiltrated ABK's underground storage tanks
("USTs"). The water rendered the gas inside the USTs unusable.
ABK subsequently made a claim ("Claim") with Respondent Mid-Century Insurance
Company ("Mid-Century") under a Business Owners Special Property Coverage policy
("Policy"), seeking payment for the costs to remediate the tainted gas in the USTs and its lost
business income for the time the gas pumps were inoperative. After investigating, Mid-Century
determined that the Policy did not provide coverage for the damages sought and denied the
Claim. ABK filed suit.
ABK's Complaint alleged two causes of action against Mid-Century: (1) breach of
contract; and (2) bad faith. R. 9, 10. The district court granted summary judgment in MidCentury's favor and dismissed the breach of contract cause of action on the grounds that the
Surface Water Exclusion and the Weather Conditions Exclusion in the Policy' both excluded
coverage. R. 295- 296. The district court also dismissed the bad faith cause of action because
there was no coverage under the Policy. R. 297.
On appeal, ABK has failed to establish that the district court erred. Consequently, the
district court's determinations should be affirmed.
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These exclusions are defined below and also included for ease of reference in Appendix A, attached hereto.
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B.

Concise Statement of Facts
ABK operates a gas station in Post Falls under the business name Jones Chevron & Deli,

which is located at E. 4000 Seltice Way. R. 64. During the relevant timeframe, ABK was
insured under a Mid-Century Business Owners Special Property Coverage policy, policy number
0605127565 (the "Policy"). R. 19.
On January 18, 2017, ABK made a Claim under the Policy, reporting "that melting snow
got into the gas tank" at its business. R. 64. ABK sought payment for the costs to remediate the
tainted gas in the tanks and lost business income for the time the gas pumps were inoperative. R.
98.
Thereafter, ABK, through Gmjeet Brar, engaged Coeur d'Alene Service Station
Equipment ("CDASSE") to troubleshoot the water infiltration problem. R. 69. The following
day, January 19, 2017, CDASSE noted that the automatic tank gauging ("ATG") probe manholes
on each UST were full of ice and water and replaced the seal caps located on the top of the riser
on the diesel and premium unleaded USTs. R. 69, 201.
On January 20, 2017, CDASSE found the vapor recovery manholes were full of ice. R.
69. It noted that the seal cap on the regular unleaded vapor recovery riser was cracked and the
plunger on the vapor adapter was not sealing. Id. It confirmed, based on this discovery, that this
was the location of the water intrusion for the regular unleaded UST. Id. CDASSE also installed
new seal caps on risers on the unleaded USTs and replaced the fill bucket drain plugs on the
unleaded USTs on January 24, 2017. Id. 2 It also extracted and disposed of the water-tainted

2

Mid-Century disagrees with AB K's statement that "the repairs to the broken parts and seals at the surface of the
tanks were completed" prior to January 25, 2017. See Appellant's Brief, p. 3. While CDASSE installed new seal
caps on risers on the unleaded USTs and replaced the fill bucket drain plugs on the unleaded USTs on January 24,
2017, this does not mean that all repairs were completed by that date.
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gasoline that same day. Id. On January 25, 2017, after ABK received more fuel, CDASSE
discovered that the unleaded USTs again contained water-tainted gasoline. R. 70.
On January 30, 2017, Mid-Century engaged En vista Forensics ("Envista") to conduct a
review in order to "verify the cause of loss related to the reported water intrusion .. . ." R. 68.
Envista spoke to Mr. Brar on January 30, 2017. R. 68. Mr. Brar indicated they had accumulated a
lot of snow leading up to January 18, 2017, and that the water infiltration and resulting phase
separation3 was discovered when the snow started to melt. R. 69. On February 10, 2017, Mr.
Brar reported to En vista that the fuel was still phase separated. R. 70. On February 17, 2017, Mr.
Brar reported to Envista that water was discovered again in the regular unleaded UST. R. 70.
On January 31 , 2017, at the behest of Mr. Brar, Northwest Environmental Solutions, Inc.
("NES"), performed leak testing on the USTs and ultimately determined there was no pressure
loss (meaning there were no leaks in the USTs). R. 112; 128- 131.
In its February 20, 2017, report prepared by Senior Technical Consultant Timothy
Hurley, Envista noted that "[w]ater can infiltrate the UST[s] if standing water was puddling
above the manholes (fill buckets, vapor risers and ATG probe risers) when the seals on the fill
bucket caps, drain plugs and vapor adaptors are in disrepair." R. 70. Envista also reviewed
Continuous Statistical Leak Detection ("CSLD") records provided by Mr. Brar, and determined
that the ATG system on each UST did not detect any leaks within the UST between December
10, 2016, and January 30, 2017. R. 69. Further, Envista noted that on January 31 , 2017, after
repairs were made, Mr. Brar had hired NES to perform certain tests, and that the USTs passed
those tests. Id.

3

Phase separation is " when the ethanol within ethanol blended gasoline attaches itself to water molecules." R. 69.
The result of phase separation is that a layer of gasoline rests on top of the water/ethanol layer because gasoline is
less dense than the water/ethanol blend. Id.

3

Envista concluded in relevant part that CDASSE "identified multiple maintenance related
issues with the regular unleaded and premium unleaded riser cap seals and vapor adaptors that
could permit water intrusion into the [USTs]." R. 70.
On February 21, 2017, ABK's owner, Gagandeep Raibhatti, emailed Mid-Century,
indicating that water had managed to get in the unleaded UST again, and that he suspected "the
fill bucket for the unleaded tank was cracked and water may have entered from there." R. 109.4
Mid-Century sent Mr. Raibhatti a denial letter dated February 22, 2017. R. 64-67. There,
Mid-Century noted that Mr. Raibhatti had "reported that melting snow got into the gas tank at
[his] business." R. 64. Mid-Century indicated that its investigation "found that maintenance
issues caused this loss" and that "[u]nfortunately, there is no coverage ... due to policy language
which excludes loss or damage caused by or resulting from wear and tear or faulty or inadequate
maintenance." Id. In this letter, Mid-Century also cited to the Water Exclusion and noted that
"[e]ven though only parts of your policy are mentioned and quoted in this letter, additional
portions may apply. If they are found to be relevant and applicable, they will be applied." R. 66.5
In an April 11, 2017, letter from Don Boyd of CDASSE to ABK, Mr. Boyd wrote in part:
"It is assumed water entered the Unlead and Premium tanks when the area over the fill buckets,
stage one vapor caps[,] and ATG caps was flooded with surface water." R. 230 (emphasis
added).
On July 21, 2017, Mr. Hurley of Envista wrote to Mid-Century, stating in relevant part:

4

ABK cites to this email in support of its statement that Mr. Hurley "gave permission to again have the tanks
cleaned and new fuel put back into the tanks" on February 20, 20 I 7. Appellant's Brief, p. 3. This is not correct. Mr.
Hurley, at the time a Senior Technical Consultant with Envista Forensics, had no authority to "give permission" to
have the tanks cleaned.
5

ABK states that Mid-Century denied the Claim "[b]ased on Mr. Hurley's report" (see Appellant's Brief, p. 3), but
Mid-Century's determination was based on "all information known to [it]" at that time. R. 66.
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As noted in Envista' s report dated February 20, 2017, CDASSE noted that the
ATG manholes on each UST were full of ice and water. ... Also, CDASSE found
the vapor recovery manholes were full of ice. The seal cap on the vapor recovery
riser on the regular unleaded UST was cracked and the plunger was not sealing.
Envista's professional opinion is that ice would not cause damage to the seals
located inside the cap of the probe or vapor risers. Envista's professional opinion
is that the seal of the vapor recovery cap would need to be in disrepair in order for
water to get in between the top of the plunger and underside of the cap. If water
was able to get in between the plunger and the cap, then it is conceivable that the
cap could crack if the water froze.
R. 132- 133.

That same day, on July 21, 2017, Mid-Century issued a claim outcome letter to ABK's
counsel. R. 98.

Therein, Mid-Century explained that based on the reports received from

CDASSE and Envista, "water got into the fuel because the seal cap on the regular unleaded
vapor recovery riser was cracked and that multiple maintenance issues were found." R. 98. MidCentury reiterated its denial of the Claim under the wear and tear and negligent maintenance
exclusions of the Policy. Id. Mid-Century then stated again that " [e]ven though only pmts of
your policy are mentioned and quoted in this letter, additional portions may apply. If they are
found to be relevant and applicable, they will be applied." R. 100.
The relevant policy language is set forth below:
Section B.1. contains the exclusion for damages caused by water ("Water Exclusion").
The Policy indicates that Mid-Century:
will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any
of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of
any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any
sequence to the loss.
g. Water
(1) Flood, surface water, waves, tides, tidal waves, overflow of
any body of water, or their spray, all whether driven by wind or
not;
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(4) Water under the ground surface pressing on, or flowing or
seeping through:
(c) Doors, windows or other openings.
R. 80-81 (emphasis added); see also Appendix A attached hereto.

The Policy also contains a Weather Conditions exclusion, which provides that MidCentury:
[W]ill not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any of the following
B.3.a. through B.3.c. But if an excluded cause of loss that is listed in B.3.a.
through B.3.c. results in a Covered Cause of Loss, we will pay for the loss or
damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss.
a. Weather Conditions
Weather conditions. But this exclusion only applies if weather conditions
contribute in any way with a cause or event excluded in Paragraph 1. above to
produce the loss or damage.
R. 83; see also Appendix A.

C.

Course of Proceedings
ABK did not provide a Course of Proceedings. Mid-Century offers the following:
ABK filed its Complaint on August 2, 2017, asserting that Mid-Century breached the

Policy and committed bad faith. R. 2, 9, 10. Mid-Century filed its Answer on September 8, 2017.
R. 11.
On March 13, 2018, Mid-Century filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with a
Memorandum in Support. R. 16, 18-35. In conjunction with its Motion for Summary Judgment,
Mid-Century submitted an affidavit of counsel (R. 55-56) and the affidavit of Cynthia Schart, a
Special Commercial Claims Representative Specialist for Mid-Century (R. 61-62). Attached to
Ms. Schart's affidavit were, among other documents, Mid-Century's denial letter to ABK dated
February 22, 2017 (R. 64-71 ), the Policy (R. 72- 93), and a claim outcome letter from MidCentury to ABK through counsel dated July 21, 2017 (R. 98-101). Finally, Mid-Century also
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submitted the affidavit of Timothy Hurley, a project consultant with Envista Forensics
("Envista"). R. 110-112. Attached to Mr. Hurley's affidavit were, among other documents, a
February 20, 2017, letter of findings containing Mr. Hurley's professional opinion concerning
the cause of the water intrusion. R. 116- 119.
On April 17, 2018, ABK filed its Response in Opposition to Mid-Century's Motion for
Summary Judgment. R. 134-145. In support of its Response in Opposition, ABK submitted a
declaration of counsel (R. 146- 147), with various attachments including an April 11, 20 17, letter
to AKB from Don Boyd of CDASSE (R. 230-231). ABK also submitted the declaration of its
expert, Ben Thomas, (R. 232-233) and his expert report (R. 253-255). Mid-Century filed its
Reply Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on April 24, 2018. R. 256270.
On June 18, 2018, the district court granted summary judgment in Mid-Century' s favor in
its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant' s Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Memorandum Decision"). R. 277-298. The district court dismissed the breach of
contract cause of action on the grounds that the Surface Water Exclusion and the Weather
Conditions Exclusion in the Policy both excluded ABK's loss. R. 295-296. The district court
dismissed the bad faith cause of action because there was no coverage under the Policy. R. 297.
On June 26, 2018, Judgment was entered and ABK's Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
R. 3 11.
Four days before that, on June 22, 2018, ABK moved for reconsideration of the district
court's Memorandum Decision. R. 300; 302- 309. Mid-Century filed its opposition to ABK's
motion for reconsideration on July 31, 2018. R. 313-327. Following a hearing on August 7,
2018, the district court denied ABK' s motion for reconsideration on September 5, 2018, in its
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order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Summary Judgment and Order Denying
Motion to Strike Untimely Pleadings ("Reconsideration Order"). R. 336-339. There, the district
court reiterated its prior holding that the Policy's Surface Water Exclusion and the Weather
Conditions Exclusion both excluded the loss suffered by ABK. ABK filed its Notice of Appeal
on October 10, 2018. R. 341.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Mid-Century believes that the "Issues Presented on Appeal" can be more clearly stated as
follows:
A. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Mid-Century
as to ABK's breach of contract cause of action.

1.

Whether the district court erred in determining that ABK's Claim was not covered
under the plain language of the Water Exclusion.

2.

Whether the district court erred in determining that ABK's Claim was not covered
under the plain language of the Weather Conditions Exclusion.

3.

Whether the district court erred in declining to apply the efficient proximate cause
rule.

B. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Mid-Century
as to ABK's bad faith cause of action.

III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standards of Review
1.

Summary Judgment. On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary

judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court originally
ruling on the motion. Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport, and

Toole, 159 Idaho 679, 689, 365 P.3d 1033, 1039 (20 16). Summary judgment is appropriate
when "the evidence in the record and any admissions show that there is no genuine issue of any
material fact regarding the issues raised in the pleadings and that the moving party is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law." Fisher v. Garrison Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 162 Idaho 149, 152, 395
P.3d 368, 371 (20 17) (citing Jnfanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102
(2002)); I.R.C.P. 56. Finally, interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law. Fisher,
162 Idaho at 153, 395 P.3d at 372.

2.

Motion to Reconsider. When a district court decides a motion to reconsider,

"the district court must apply the same standard of review that the court applied when deciding
the original order that is being reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281
P.3d 103, 113 (2012). When this Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
for reconsideration, it uses the same standard of review the lower court used in deciding the
motion for reconsideration. Liberty, 159 Idaho at 686, 365 P.3d at 1040.
B.

The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of MidCentury as to ABK's Breach of Contract Cause of Action.
1.

The District Court Did Not Err In Determining that ABK's Claim Was Not
Covered Under the Plain Language of the Policy Because the Water
Exclusion Applies.

The Water Exclusion of the Policy contains both a Surface Water Exclusion and a
separate Ground Water Exclusion. R. 80-81. The district court correctly held that Mid-Century's
"water exclusion is clear, precise, and unambiguous, and the Court must apply it as a matter of
law to exclude coverage for the damage caused by the water infiltration." R. 295; 340 (citations
omitted). ABK has failed on appeal to demonstrate that the district court's conclusion was in
error. Therefore, its holding should be affirmed.

a.

The Surface Water Exclusion Unambiguously Applies to Water
Infiltration Caused by Melting Snow, and Therefore Precludes Coverage.

The standards applicable to insurance contracts and the interpretation thereof are wellestablished. Generally, Idaho courts construe insurance contracts in accordance with their plain,
unambiguous language. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho
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660, 663, 115 P.3d 751, 754 (2005). In interpreting an insurance policy, "where the policy
language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must be determined, as a matter of law, according
to the plain meaning of the words used." Rizza v. State Farm Ins. Co., 155 Idaho 75, 79, 305
P.3d 519, 523 (2013) (citations omitted). When there is no ambiguity, the burden is on the
insured to demonstrate that a loss is within the general coverage provisions of the insurance
contract. Buckley v. Orem, 112 Idaho 117, 120, 730 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Ct. App.1986). Then the
insurer bears the burden to show that an exclusion applies. Id. See also Perry v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 100, 103, 936 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1997).

This Court has already determined that "the meaning of surface water is clear and
unambiguous." Rizza, 155 Idaho at 82, 305 P.3d at 526. In Rizzo, this Court cited favorably to
the following definition:
Surface water is water diffused over the surface of the land. Any water on the
earth's surface, including water from rising groundwater, may be surface water
unless or until it forms some more definite body of water. Typically, surface
water is created by rain or other precipitation ... .
Id. (citing 11 Couch on Ins. § 153:50). As noted by the district court, one undisputed source of

the water infiltration was "melting snow, ice and water" and "surface water most commonly
derives from rain, springs, or melting snow." R. 295 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
Because the Policy expressly excludes coverage for damages caused directly or indirectly
by surface water, the district court correctly held that the Surface Water Exclusion is "clear,
precise, and unambiguous, and the Court must apply it as a matter of law to exclude coverage for
the damages caused by the water infiltration." R. 82, 295.
At no point has ABK alleged that the Surface Water Exclusion is ambiguous. Instead,
ABK argues that the "district court improperly weighed the evidence to conclude that the source
10

of water infiltration was surface water." Appellant's Brief, p. 6. ABK takes issue with the district
court's finding that "[t]he record contains unrebutted evidence that one source of the water
infiltration was melting snow, ice and water that entered the underground storage tanks through
the cracks in the vapor riser caps and a crack in the spill or fill bucket." Id. , pp. 7- 8.
The district court did not weigh the evidence presented. Rather, ABK failed to create a
genuine issue of material fact that would take its Claim outside the Surface Water Exclusion.6
Indeed, ABK still fails to dispute that "one source of the water infiltration was melting snow, ice
and water." And it would be hard pressed to do so because it is unrebutted that when ABK made
the Claim, it reported that melting snow got into the USTs after a period of heavy snow. R. 64,
69. Moreover, it is unrebutted that the company hired by ABK to determine the cause of the
infiltration found the vapor recovery lids were full of ice, the seal cap was cracked, and the vapor
adaptor was not sealing. R. 69, 122, 230- 231 , 295. In light of the unrefuted facts, the district
court properly held that "one source of the water infiltration was melting snow, ice and water."
R. 295. This is sufficient to trigger and apply the unambiguous Surface Water Exclusion since

"[s]uch loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss." R. 81.
ABK also argues incorrectly that "the district court erred in determining that MidCentury had proven that the loss was caused by surface water." Appellant's Brief, p. 9. This
argument assumes, without establishing, that it was Mid-Century's burden to conclusively prove
that surface water was the source of the damage. Instead-under well-established summary
judgment principles-Mid-Century needed only to meet its initial burden to demonstrate that the
Surface Water Exclusion was applicable. ABK's argument fails because it assumes the Surface

6

ABK also argues that it presented "evidence that the source of the water was ground water." Appellant's Brief, p.
8. This argument, and the Ground Water Exclusion in general, is addressed herein at pages 13-18.
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Water Exclusion only applies if surface water is the source of the damage. But the Surface Water
Exclusion is triggered if surface water is a source of the damage. R. 81.
Mid-Century capably met this burden by providing evidence that a source of the water
infiltration was melting snow and ice (surface water). R. 292. Mid-Century established that the
area had accumulated a lot of snow leading up to January 18, 2017, and that the fugitive water
was detected when the snow started to melt. Id. ABK's own claim was that "melting snow got
into the gas tank" at its gas station. Id. Mid-Century also provided reports from CDASSE that
revealed the vapor recovery riser lids were "cracked and packed full of ice," and the vapor
adaptor was not sealing. R. 122, 292. The testimony of Timothy Hurley of Envista and Don
Boyd of CDASSE further supported the conclusion that the water infiltration was caused by
melting snow and ice. R. 292-293.

ABK's response below was fatally flawed insofar as it failed to meet its burden to present
more than a scintilla of evidence and create a genuine issue of material fact that the water
infiltration was not caused by melting snow or ice (surface water). It did not rebut its own
statement about the source of the water. It did not rebut the findings made by its own repair
company as to the cause of the water infiltration. It did not point to another source of the water
infiltration (other than to argue that the melting snow transmuted from surface water to ground
water). On appeal, ABK continues to ignore its own burden at the summary judgment stage.
ABK has failed on appeal to demonstrate the district court erred in concluding that one source of
the water infiltration was surface water.
In short, ABK has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred when it applied the

undisputed facts to the unambiguous Policy language. The Surface Water Exclusion applies to
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exclude damages caused by the melting snow, and therefore, the district court' s grant of
summary judgment as to ABK's breach of contract cause of action was appropriate.
b.

While the Ground Water Exclusion Presents an Alternative Basis to
Affirm the District Court's Award of Summary Judgment, Any Ground
Water Necessarily Came From the Surface Water Pooling On Top of the
USTs, Which Means the Surface Water Exclusion Still Applies.

In addition to excluding "surface water," the Water Exclusion also explicitly and
separately excludes "Water under the ground surface pressing on, or flowing or seeping through
doors, windows or other openings." R. 81. ABK has referred to this latter exclusion as the
"ground water exclusion." R. 142.
In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Mid-Century argued

that the Water Exclusion applied to preclude coverage, regardless of whether the water that
infiltrated the USTs was "surface water" or "[w]ater under the ground surface." R. 27 ("Because
the alleged damages stem from water intrusion into the underground storage tanks, the damages
are all directly related to water, whether the water be deemed ' surface water' or 'water under the
ground surface .. . seeping through . .. openings." ').
In its opposition to Mid-Century's Motion for Summary Judgment, ABK responded that:

"Mid-Century has not offered any opinion or evidence regarding the source of the water.
Therefore, it has not met its burden of proof as to the applicability of either the surface water or
ground water exclusions." R. 142. It also noted that "openings" was not defined in the Policy and
argued that it must "be read in the context of the surrounding policy language which . .. refers to
parts of a building or house." R. 143.7 At no point in its opposition did ABK argue that the water

7

ABK raises this exact argument again on appeal. Mid-Century's response can be fo und at pages 16- 18 of this

brief.
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that infiltrated the USTs was, in fact, ground water. Rather, its argument was that Mid-Century
failed to meet "its burden of proving the source of the water." R. 143.

In its Memorandum Decision, the district court reasoned:
Plaintiff argues that the water exception does not apply because Defendant has
failed to show that the damage was caused by surface or ground water. However,
Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence or alternate theory as to the source of
the water infiltration. Plaintiff has failed to raise more than a scintilla of evidence
to dispute the nature and cause of the damage to the underground storage tanks.
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the source
of the water infiltration which would prevent summary judgment under

Ahluwalia.
R. 293 (citations omitted).

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, ABK argued, for the first
time, that "Mr. Boyd concluded that the source of the water was ground water." R. 305. In
response, Mid-Century argued that the only possible source of any alleged ground water "was
the surface water, which brings this other source within the exclusion." R. 319, n.1. 8 That is,
" [t]he Policy's Water Exclusion applies if surface water 'directly or indirectly' caused any
damages. If the surface water saturated the ground to the point that water infiltrated the Tanks,
the surface water indirectly caused the loss and thus the exclusion applies." R. 319, n.l (citations
omitted).
In its Reconsideration Order, the district court reiterated its prior holding that MidCentury's "water exclusion is clear, precise, and unambiguous, and the Court must apply it as a
matter of law to exclude coverage for the damage caused by the water infiltration." R.340

8

Mr. Boyd uses ground water to describe water below the surface without providing any evidence of a ground water
table or separate source of this ground water. R. 230-23 1. The only evidence presented is that this "ground water"
is surface waler saturated into the ground. Mr. Boyd even notes: "It is assumed water entered the Unlead[ed] and
Premium tanks when the area over the fill buckets, stage one vapor caps[,] and ATG caps was flooded with surface
waler." R. 230 .
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(citations omitted). The district court properly held that "the damages at issue in this case were
caused, at least in part, by surface water." R. 339.
ABK fails to show any error on appeal. Indeed, ABK raises the same flawed arguments it
raised below. First, it asserts that there is conflicting evidence in the record as to whether the
water that infiltrated the USTs was surface water or ground water. Appellant's Brief, p. 13.
Second, it argues that the Ground Water Exclusion does not apply because "openings" in the
Policy is undefined and must refer to openings in buildings. Each of these arguments is refuted
below.
ABK's argument that there is conflicting evidence in the record as to whether the water
that infiltrated the USTs was surface water or ground water is immaterial and incorrect. This
argument is immaterial because the water that infiltrated the UST's was originally surface water,
which, even if it transmuted into ground water before it entered the UST's, is still excluded. The
Surface Water Exclusion applies if surface water "directly or indirectly" causes any damages,
"regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the
loss." R. 80. Assuming for the sake of argument that the water that ultimately infiltrated the
USTs was "ground water," there is no evidence in the record that the ground water came from
any source other than the surface water that pooled on top of the USTs. Thus-at the very
least-surface water indirectly caused ABK's damages, and the Surface Water Exclusion
therefore applies to exclude coverage.
ABK's argument that there is conflicting evidence in the record as to whether the water
that infiltrated the USTs was surface water or ground water is also incorrect. In support of this
proposition, ABK cites to one statement from Mr. Hurley, and one statement from Mr. Boyd.
Appellant's Brief, p. 12. Mr. Hurley stated, in relation to one of the later water infiltrations, that

15

-

-

- • ~......- , ••~ ~ ~ · , , ~ , - " ~ • - - -

-

•.I-.

•

.

•

•

•

•

'

.•.-

"the precise reason that phase separation was detected after CDASSE performed the product line
cleaning on January 24th is not known at this time." R. 293. Mr. Boyd noted that "[i]t is our
understanding the Unlead[ed] tank settled down and stayed water free coming to the conclusion
that water was entering the tank from below grade of the spill bucket." R. 231. These
statements- taken alone or together-fail to create a genuine issue of material fact that water
infiltrated the USTs and that a source of that water was surface water. These statements do
nothing to call into question the unrebutted facts that any "ground water" necessarily came from
the surface water that pooled on top of the USTs. The evidence before the district court was not
conflicting. Rather, ABK failed to create a genuine issue of material fact below.
ABK further argues that the Ground Water Exclusion does not apply because "openings"
in the Policy is undefined and must refer to openings in buildings as opposed to underground
storage tanks. Appellant's Brief, pp. 11- 12. ABK is referring to the following language in the
Policy:
[Mid-Century] will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any
of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or
event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.
g. Water
(4) Water under the ground surface pressing on, or flowing or seeping through:
(c) Doors, windows or other openings.
R. 81 (emphasis added).

In support of this argument, ABK cites to the unpublished Kansas district court case of
M&M Holdings, Inc. v. State Auto Property and Cas. Ins. Co., No. 06-4031-SAC, WL 1531843

(May 25, 2007). In M &M, underground storage tanks rose from their pit and broke through the
overlaying slab "due to normally occurring ground water conditions and the fact that the two
most northern tanks were nearly empty." Id., *l. The M&M case is both non-controlling and
16
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distinguishable-while M &M involved the same groundwater exclusion at issue here, the surface
water exclusion was not at issue. The M &M comt determined that the ground water exclusion
was inapplicable because, for it to apply, ground water needed to press on "walls." Id., at *5. The
question became, then, whether tank surfaces qualified as "walls." Id. The M&M court
concluded that the ground water exclusion did not apply. Utilizing the noscitur a sociis canon of
construction, it determined that "walls" had to refer to parts of a building since the other terms
listed in that same passage were commonly used to describe part of a building, but not typically
used to describe the outside of an underground storage tank. Id. ABK now argues that this Court
should undertake a similar analysis, also apply the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,9 and conclude
that "other openings" must refer to openings in a building. Appellant's Brief, p. 12.
Mid-Century did not locate any Idaho appellate cases where noscitur a sociis was applied
when construing a contract-its application in Idaho appears to be limited to assisting with the
interpretation of statutes and regulations. Most recently, this Court cited to this "legal maxim" in
the context of interpreting IDAPA regulations. Chandler's-Boise LLC v. Idaho State Tax

Comm'n, 162 Idaho 447, 453, 398 P.3d 180, 186 (2017). But even if the Court recognizes the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis as a canon of construction applicable to insurance policies, canons
of construction are only deployed when an ambiguity exists. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v.

Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235-36, 912 P.2d 119, 122-23 (1996) ("The described provisions also
do not create an ambiguity which we must construe with the assistance of the various canons of
construction."). There is no ambiguity here.
This Court recently reiterated well-established Idaho law that "unless a contrary intent is
shown, common, non-technical words are given the meaning applied by laymen in daily usage9

Noscitur a sociis is defined as "[a] canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase,
especially one in a list, should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it." NOSCITUR A socns, Black's
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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as opposed to the meaning derived from legal usage- in order to effectuate the intent of the
parties." McFarland v. Liberty Insurance Corp., Dkt. No. 45781, p. 6 (Jan. 30, 2019) (citations
omitted). Thus, this Court must look to the common definition of the term "other openings." Id.
ABK acknowledges that "the cracks in the riser caps and spill buckets were identified as
the means of the water infiltration." Appellant's Brief, p. 17. These cracks plainly qualify as
"other openings." Therefore, regardless of whether the water was surface water or ground water,
ABK cannot dispute that it seeped through other openings-here cracks in the riser caps and spill
buckets. The Ground Water Exclusion therefore unambiguously applies to preclude coverage.
The district court appropriately found that the Surface Water Exclusion was applicable.
Nevertheless, the Ground Water Exclusion presents an alternative basis to affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment in Mid-Century' s favor.
2.

The District Court Did Not Err In Determining that ABK's Claim Was Not
Covered Under the Plain Language of the Policy Because the Weather
Conditions Exclusion Also Excludes ABK's Claim.

In its Memorandum Decision, the district court concluded that the Weather Conditions
Exclusion of the Policy-in addition to the Surface Water Exclusion-also prohibited coverage
of the Claim. The district court reasoned as follows:
Because the Court determined that Plaintiff's damages claim falls within the
water exclusion listed in Section B.1.g., the weather conditions exclusion also
applies to Plaintiff' s claim, given the plain language of the exclusion.
Specifically, without the heavy snow there would not have been melting snow to
infiltrate the underground storage tanks. Thus, the weather conditions contributed
to an excluded cause or event under the Policy.
R. 296. The district court's conclusion was correct because it appropriately applied the
undisputed facts to the unambiguous Policy language.
The applicable portion of the Policy provides:
3. We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any of the
following B.3.a. through B.3.c.. But if an excluded cause of loss that is listed in
18

B.3.a. through B.3.c. results in a Covered Cause of Loss, we will pay for the loss
or damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss.
a. Weather Conditions
Weather conditions. But this exclusion only applies if weather conditions
contribute in any way with a cause or event excluded in Paragraph l. above
to produce the loss or damage.
R. 83. Paragraph 1 states: "We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by
any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that
contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss." R. 80. The exclusions listed in
Paragraph 1 include Water. R. 80-81.
On appeal, ABK asserts the district court erred in holding that the Weather Conditions
Exclusion also applies to exclude coverage for three reasons: (1) " [t]he weather exclusion can
never act as a stand alone exclusion for coverage because it always has to combine with another
exclusion from the policy to apply"; (2) there are "material questions of fact whether it was
surface water or ground water that infiltrated the tanks" and therefore, "it was inappropriate to
grant summary judgment"; and (3) "if weather resulted in a Covered Cause of Loss

(contaminated gasoline) that was not caused by another excluded peril, the ensuing or resulting
loss is covered." These arguments are unavailing.
First, ABK's argument that "[t]he weather exclusion can never act as a stand alone
exclusion for coverage because it always has to combine with another exclusion from the policy
to apply" fails to establish that the district court erred because this statement is immaterial and
only partially correct. The Weather Conditions Exclusion can act as a separate, independent
basis to exclude coverage. But ABK is correct that the Weather Conditions exclusion only
applies if weather conditions contribute in any way with, relevant here, a cause or event excluded
by the Water Exclusion. R. 83.
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ABK's argument is immaterial, however, because the district court determined, in
accordance with the unambiguous Policy language, that the Weather Conditions Exclusion
applied because "weather conditions contributed to an excluded cause or event under the
Policy"- namely "the water exclusion listed in Section B.1.g." R. 296. The district court did not
apply the Weather Conditions Exclusion in isolation. Rather, it properly determined that the
weather conditions (namely, heavy snow-to use ABK's verbiage) "combine[d] with another
exclusion from the [P]olicy." ABK's argument fails to demonstrate how the district court's
analysis or application of the Weather Conditions Exclusion was in error.
Second, ABK asserts that there are "material questions of fact whether it was surface
water or ground water that infiltrated the tanks" and therefore, "it was inappropriate to grant
summary judgment" under the Weather Conditions Exclusion. Appellant's Brief, p. 14. This
argument gets ABK nowhere because both surface water and ground water fall within the
broader Water Exclusion and thus both are excluded from coverage. R. 8 1. Because both surface
water and ground water fall within the Water Exclusion, either can be combined with the
Weather Conditions Exclusion to preclude coverage under that provision. R. 80-81. 10
Third and finally, ABK argues that "if weather resulted in a Covered Cause of Loss
(contaminated gasoline) that was not caused by another excluded peril, the ensuing or resulting

loss is covered." Appellant's Brief, p. 14. 11 This argument stems from the Policy language that

10

Nor are there any material questions of fact regarding whether surface water infiltrated the USTs as discussed
infra.
11

This argument is vaguely reminiscent of an argument made by ABK in its summary judgment briefing. Be low,
ABK argued that the Policy "contains an e nsuing loss clause" that "gives back coverage for damages resulting from
negligent maintenance." R. 139 (emphasis omitted). ABK's argument regarding the ensuing loss provision below
was limited to responding to Mid-Century's argument that the Negligent Mainte nance Exclusion applied. See R.
139. O n appeal, ABK has abandoned any e nsuing loss provision argument, which makes sense because the district
court denied summary judgment on this basis, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as 10 the
application of the Negligent Maintenance Exclusion. That determination has not been appealed by either party (nor
could it be since the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order).
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provides: "But if an excluded cause of loss that is listed in B.3.a. through B.3.c. results in a
Covered Cause of Loss, we will pay for the loss or damage caused by that Covered Cause of
Loss." R. 83.
With this argument, ABK intimates that contaminated gasoline is a Covered Cause of
Loss. But contaminated gasoline is the loss itself-not the cause of the loss. ABK has
acknowledged this in the past. R. 141 ("The loss in this case (gas contamination) was caused by
water. . . ."). In short, there is a distinction between a "Covered Cause of Loss" and a "Covered
Loss." The Policy cannot be reasonably interpreted to conflate or equate the two. For these
reasons, ABK' s suggestion that contaminated gasoline is a Covered Cause of Loss must fail.
ABK's argument fails for the additional reason that it incorrectly assumes that the district
court erred in finding that surface water caused the loss (contaminated gasoline). As explained
above, ABK failed to create any genuine issues of material fact that surface water did not lead to
the contamination of the gasoline here. Surface water, of course, is not a "Covered Cause of
Loss"-it is explicitly, unambiguously excluded from coverage under the Policy.
In sum, ABK has failed to demonstrate how the district court erred when it held that the

Weather Conditions Exclusion also precluded coverage of its Claim.

3.

ABK Failed to Preserve the Issue of Whether the District Court Erred in
Declining to Apply the Efficient Proximate Cause Rule.

ABK argues that the district court erred in declining to apply the efficient proximate
cause rule. Appellant's Brief, p. 14. However, ABK failed to preserve this issue on appeal
because it did not raise the issue until its Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration of the
district court's Memorandum Decision. R. 306. There, ABK simply stated, without argument or
legal analysis, that "there is insufficient evidence that surface water was the efficient proximate
cause of [its] damages." R. 308. Mid-Century responded in its opposition to ABK's motion for
21

reconsideration that the district court need not-and indeed, could not-engage in an efficient
proximate cause analysis because the Policy unambiguously contracts out of that analysis. 12 R.
321-322. ("According to the [P]olicy language, Mid-Century will not pay for "damages caused
directly or indirectly" by "surface water" and that "[s]uch loss or damage is excluded regardless
of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.")
In its reply brief in support of its motion for reconsideration, ABK argued-and

presented legal analysis for the first time-that the efficient proximate cause rule has been
adopted by a majority of jurisdictions and that insurance companies cannot "circumvent" the
same "through creative drafting of exclusionary clauses." R. 331. Ultimately, in its
Reconsideration Order, the district court held:
The Court considered the applicability of the efficient cause analysis and finds as
a matter of law that the clear and unambiguous language of the insurance policy,
specifically the surface water exclusion, directs the Court to not conduct any
efficient cause analysis.

Therefore, the efficient cause analysis is not applicable to the water exclusion.
R. 339,340.

This Court has held-on at least two occasions-that an issue may be considered waived
if raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. State v. Rubbermaid, Inc. , 129 Idaho
353, 357, 924 P.2d 615, 619 (1996); AJA Servs. Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 136 Idaho
184, 188, 30 P.3d 962,966 (2001).
In AJA Services, this Court determined that AIA Services failed to preserve for appeal the

claim that the method of taxation adopted by the Idaho State Tax Commission-taxing the entire
dividends paid to AIA Services from a subsidiary, and not just those generated in Idaho- is
12

At no point in its opposition to ABK's motion for reconsideration did Mid-Century "acknowledge[] the general
applicability of the e fficient proximate cause rule in insurance coverage analysis" as suggested by ABK. See R. 331.
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unconstitutional. This Court determined that "AIA Services failed to properly raise its
constitutional claims" because AIA Services had only raised the argument in its motion for
reconsideration. AJA Servs. Corp., 136 Idaho 184, 188, 30 P.3d 962, 966 (2001).
Here, ABK failed to preserve the issue of whether the district court erred in declining to
apply the efficient proximate cause rule because it did not make a substantive argument or
provide legal analysis until its reply brief in support of its Motion for Reconsideration. While the
words "efficient proximate cause" appear twice in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration, ABK waited until its reply brief in support of its Motion for Reconsideration to
argue and present legal authority that the efficient proximate cause rule has been adopted by a
majority of jurisdictions and that insurance companies cannot avoid the application of the rule
through creative drafting. 13 R. 331. This Court should again hold, in accordance with its prior
holdings in AJA Services Corporation v. Idaho State Tax Commission and State v. Rubbermaid,

Inc., that ABK failed to preserve this issue for appeal by not raising it until its briefing in support
of its Motion for Reconsideration.

4.

Assuming ABK Preserved This Issue for Appeal, the District Court Did Not
Err In Declining to Apply the Efficient Proximate Cause Rule.

The efficient proximate cause has been defined as that cause that sets the other causes in
motion and is the predominant cause. 7 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 101 :57 (3d ed. 1997). When the efficient proximate cause doctrine is applied, it
means that an insurer must provide coverage when a covered peril is the efficient proximate
cause of the damage or loss. Id.

13

ABK is mistaken on this score as discussed below. Idaho courts have not adopted the efficient proximate cause
rule, and only four states have determined that insurance companies cannot contract around the efficient proximate
cause rule. Idaho is not one of the four.
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As explained below, the efficient proximate cause rule has not been adopted by Idaho
courts and this Court should decline to adopt the rule in this case. Even if this Comt does adopt
the efficient proximate cause rule (which it need not do to decide this appeal), the Policy
precludes application of the rule based on the anti-concurrent cause provision therein.
a.

Idaho Courts Have Not Adopted the Efficient Proximate Cause Rule.

Idaho appellate courts have not adopted the efficient proximate cause rule. Mid-Century
is unaware of any caselaw establishing that such rule has been or should be applied in this state,
and ABK has failed to cite to any convincing authority that suggests otherwise.
Instead, in support of its argument that "Idaho courts have adopted the efficient
proximate cause analysis relating to insurance coverage[,]" ABK cites to two Court of Appeals
decisions issued over thirty years ago: Burgess Farms v. New Hampshire Insurance Group, 108
Idaho 831, 702 P.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1985) and Jones v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Company , 105 Idaho 520, 670 P.2d 1305 (1983). Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-16. Neither case

adopts the efficient proximate cause rule.
In Burgess Farms, the Court of Appeals considered whether destruction of potatoes
stored in a cellar could be covered under an insurance policy with a vandalism and malicious
mischief endorsement. Burgess Farms, 108 Idaho at 832-33, 702 P.2d at 870-7 1. The potatoes
were destroyed after water breached a dike and flowed into a nearby potato cellar. Id. The
evidence showed that a vehicle had been driven through the dike, which in turn led to the water
breaching the same. Id.
The Court of Appeals in Burgess Farms stopped far short of adopting the efficient
proximate cause rule. While the Court of Appeals mentions "proximate cause" and explores the
definition thereof, it did so because under the terms of the policy at issue, an intentional act had
to be the proximate cause of the damage for coverage to exist. The Court of Appeals explained:
24

Under the terms of the policy, vandalism and malicious mischief require the
conjunction of two elements: (1) an intentional act; and (2) a malicious purpose
or, simply, malice. Once these elements are established, it is then incumbent upon
the party claiming coverage to show that the intentional act was the proximate
cause of the damage or destruction.
Burgess Farms, 108 Idaho at 833, 702 P.2d at 871 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals went

on to say:
As noted, in addition to the conjunction between an intentional act and malice, the
act must be the proximate cause of the damage or destruction. Cf Graham v.
Public Employees Mutual Ins. Co., 98 Wash. 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983) 14 (not
involving a vandalism or malicious mischief, but overruling a case that did and
which also required a "direct, violent and efficient cause").
Id. , 108 Idaho at 834-35, 702 P.2d at 872-73 (emphasis added).

In sum, the Court of Appeals examined the definition of "proximate cause" in Burgess
Farms because the policy at issue there required that an intentional act be the proximate cause of

the damage for coverage to exist. There is nothing in Burgess Farms to suggest that the Court of
Appeals intended or did adopt the efficient proximate cause rule to be applied in insurance
cases-and it would have had no reason to do so since the policy there already included an
express proximate cause requirement.
The other case cited by ABK, Jones v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Company, is even more far afield. The primary issue there was the interpretation of an employee

benefit plan. Jones v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company, 105 Idaho 520, 523,
670 P.2d 1305, 1308 (1983). The employee benefit plan unambiguously provided that "an
accident must be the sole cause of the injuries in order for those injuries to be covered by the
plan." Id., 105 Idaho at 526, 670 P.2d at 1311. The district court had held that the appellant was
entitled to disability benefits because the appellant's injuries were "proximately caused"- not

14

As explained below, Washington law differs greatly from Idaho law as to the adoption and application of the
efficient proximate cause rule.
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"solely" caused-by an on-the-job accident. The Court of Appeals ultimately construed the
policy at issue a.rid determined that the district court reached the right result, but had "used
somewhat different language" when it articulated the standard as "whether the accident was a

proximate cause of [appellant's] injury or disability." Id., 105 Idaho at 530, 670 P.2d at 1314.
The Court of Appeals' holding and rationale in Jones has no applicability to the present case.
Nothing in Jones suggests that the Court of Appeals was adopting the efficient proximate cause
rule to be applied in insurance cases. Rather, the Court of Appeals was simply interpreting the
policy at issue.
ABK has not cited to any other Idaho authority in support of its contention that "Idaho

courts have adopted the efficient proximate cause analysis relating to insurance coverage" and
Mid-Century is unaware of any Idaho precedent that could reasonably be interpreted to support
that proposition. The Court of Appeals cases cited by ABK- Burgess Farms and Jones-do not
come close to adopting the efficient proximate cause rule. Thus, Idaho has not, in fact, adopted
the efficient proximate cause rule. And for the reasons discussed below, this Court should
decline to do so in this case.
b.

This Court Should Decline to Adopt the Efficient Proximate Cause Rule in
this Case.

This Court should decline to adopt the efficient proximate cause rule because this appeal
can be decided without doing so. That is, this Court can look to the language of the Policy to
conclude-just like the district court concluded- that the Policy precludes it from conducting
any efficient proximate cause analysis. R. 339. 15

15

This approach- looking to the plain language o f the Policy to conclude that the parties have contracted out of
application of efficient proximate cause-would be the most efficient means of substantively addressing ABK's
argument that the di strict court erred in holding that the efficie nt proximate cause rule is inapplicable. This analysis,
and why it should be undertaken here, is fully addressed in section III.B .4.c. of this brief.
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Preliminarily, if the Court is inclined to adopt the efficient proximate cause rule (which it
need not do to decide this appeal) then it should be noted that the vast majority of states that have
adopted the efficient proximate cause rule also permit the parties to contract out of it. 16 See also
Julie A. Passa, INSURANCE LAW - PROPERTY INSURANCE: ADOPTING THE EFFICIENT PROXIMATE
CAUSE DOCTRINE, BUT SA YING NO TO CONTRACTING OUT OF IT WESTERN NATIONAL MUTUAL
INSURANCE Co. V. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA, 2002 ND 63 , 643 N.W.2D 4, 79 N.D. L. Rev.
561 , 568 (2003) ("Most courts have held that parties have the freedom to contract as they choose
and therefore may contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine.")
Permitting parties to contract out of the efficient proximate cause rule would correspond
with well-established existing Idaho law, which provides that courts may not rewrite a contract
for the parties. See Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41, 72 P.3d 877, 881
(2003) (holding courts do not have power to rewrite contracts to make them more fair); see also

§ 31 :5. Courts may not rewrite the contract, 11 Williston on Contracts § 31 :5 (4th ed.) ("[C]ourts
properly and steadfastly reiterate the well-established principle that it is not the function of the
judiciary to change the obligations of a contract which the parties have seen fit to make."). This
16

As of 2007, of the 35 states that have explicitly adopted the efficient proximate cause rule, only four (California,
North Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia) have determined that the parties lo an insurance contract canno t
contract out of the effic ient proximate cause rule. Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen, CONCURRENT CAUSATION
VERSUS EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE IN FIRST-PARTY PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE ANALYSIS, American Bar
Assoc.,
Vol.
36,
No.
2
(Winter
2007)
(available
at:
https://www.amclaw.com/wpconlent/uploads/20 14/07/Concurrent-Causation-versus-Efficient-Proximate-Cause-in-First-Party-PropertyInsurance-Coverage-Analysis-by-Michael-C.pdf.) California and North Dakota's legislatures codified the efficie nt
proximate cause rule in their statutes and expressly precluded the inclusion of anti-concurrent causation lang uage.
Id. (citing Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2 18 Ca. App. 3d 1446, 1452 (1990) (citing CAL.INS. CODE§§
530 and 532; W Nat'/ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N. Dak. , 643 N.W2d 4 (N.D. 2003) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §
26.1-32-0 I). For its part, a West Virginia court reasoned that parties could not contract around the rule because it
was the law of the state. Id. (citing Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 509 S.E.2d I, 15 (W. Va. 1998). And
finally, a Washington court disallowed the anti-concurrent causation language, but only because the policy was
ambiguous and therefore, was construed in favor of the insured. Id. (citing Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d
413(Wash.1989).
Importantly, "[a]II other jurisdictions have been sile nt on the issue or have allowed insurers to draft around the
doctrine[] of ... efficient proximate cause." Id. , at p. 10. The majority rule, therefore, is to permit parties to contract
out of the e fficie nt proximate cause rule.
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Court has also acknowledged that "[f]reedom to contract is an important and integral part of
American industry and commerce." Toivo Pottala Logging, Inc. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 112
Idaho 489,492, 733 P.2d 710, 713 (1987).
ABK argues-without citation to any authority-that the Policy's anti-concurrent
causation language 17 "is clearly intended to circumvent the efficient proximate cause rule, which
is prohibited under Idaho law." Appellant's Brief, p. 18. Anti-concurrent causation language is
not prohibited under Idaho law, and ABK has failed to point to any authority suggesting
otherwise. There is no reason to suspect that anti-concurrent causation clauses are anything but
valid in Idaho given this Court's endorsement of the freedom to contract, coupled with its
prohibition against courts rewriting contracts.
In sum, both Idaho case law and general contract principles promote and encourage the
freedom to contract, while the vast majority of other jurisdictions have concluded that parties
should be able to contract out of the efficient proximate cause rule. With this weight of authority
and clear pronouncement that courts may not rewrite contracts, it necessarily follows that in
Idaho, there is no prohibition against contracting around the efficient proximate cause rule-a
rule that has yet to be adopted in this state.
c.

The Policy contains unambiguous anti-concurrent causation language and
as a result, the parties contracted out of the efficient proximate cause rule
even it if applied here.

Even if the Court assumes without deciding that the efficient proximate cause rule
applies, the district court's grant of summary judgment should nonetheless be affirmed because
the Policy contains unambiguous anti-concurrent causation language. This language effectively
contracts out of any efficient proximate cause application.
17

The anti-concurrent causation language referred to herein is as follows: Mid-Century "will not pay for loss or
damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excl uded regardless of any
other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss." R. 80.
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ABK claims that the district court's "acknowledgement that there may have been more
than one source or cause of the water infiltration should have triggered an efficient proximate
cause analysis." Appellant's Brief, p. 17. In so arguing, ABK not only assumes incorrectly that
the efficient proximate cause rule applies in Idaho, but also fails to explain why this analysis
should have been triggered given the district court's interpretation of the plain language of the
Policy and the existence of the anti-concurrent causation policy language.
In its Reconsideration Order, the district court held that based on the plain language in the

Policy, it was precluded from conducting an efficient proximate cause analysis. More
specifically, and in the context of applying the Surface Water Exclusion to hold that denial of
coverage was appropriate, the district court reasoned as follows:
The Court considered the applicability of the efficient cause analysis and finds as
a matter of law that the clear and unambiguous language of the insurance policy,
specifically the surface water exclusion, directs the Court to not conduct any
efficient cause analysis. The language reads as follows:
The policy indicates that Mid-Century:
will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the
following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event
that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss .
.. . g. Water
(1 ) Flood, surface water, waves, tides, tidal waves, overflow of any body of water,
or their spray, all whether driven by wind or not;
The Court reaffirms its holding that, "[M[]]id-Century's water exclusion is clear,
precise, and unambiguous, and the Court must apply it as a matter of law to
exclude coverage for the damage caused by the water infiltration." Therefore, the
efficient cause analysis is not applicable to the water exclusion.
R. 339-340 (citations omitted).

ABK's argument on appeal is notable for what it omits. ABK does not argue and has

never taken the position that the Policy's Water Exclusion, or its anti-concurrent causation
language (i.e. that Mid-Century "will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by
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any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that
contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss") is ambiguous or unclear or inapplicable.

It does not challenge the district court's interpretation of that language. For the most part, ABK's
argument ignores the anti-concurrent causation language in the Policy altogether, except to
note-incorrectly and without citation to authority-that the anti-concurrent causation language
"is prohibited under Idaho law." Appellant's Brief, p. 18.

In sum, ABK's argument that the district court should have applied the efficient
proximate cause rule (1) assumes incorrectly that the efficient proximate cause rule has been
adopted in Idaho; (2) assumes incorrectly and without citation to any authority that parties cannot
contract out of the efficient proximate cause rule using anti-concurrent causation language; (3)
ignores the applicable Policy language that unambiguously excludes coverage for losses caused
directly or indirectly by surface water regardless of any other cause that contributes; and (4) fails
to challenge the district court's interpretation of that language.
The Policy is clear: as long as surface water caused ABK's damages either directly or
indirectly, with any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any other sequence,
the loss is excluded from coverage. ABK has failed to show that the district court erred in
interpreting and applying the unambiguous language of the Policy. The district court did not err
in granting summary judgment in Mid-Century's favor, or in denying ABK's Motion for
Reconsideration.

C.

The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of MidCentury as to ABK's Bad Faith Cause of Action.
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court held that ABK's bad faith claim failed as

a matter of law because there was no coverage under the Policy. R. 297. In its opening brief,
ABK argues that "[b ]ecause the district court erred in determining that coverage was excluded,
30

its dismissal of the bad faith claim based on the finding of no coverage was improper."
Appellant' s Brief, p. 19.
The district court did not err when it granted summary judgment on ABK's bad faith
claim. It is well-established that coverage under the insurance policy at issue is "[f]undamental to
the claim of bad faith." Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 137
Idaho 173, 178, 45 P.3d 829, 834 (2002). ABK does not question or appeal the district court' s
rationale that coverage must exist for a bad faith claim to exist. Rather, ABK only challenges the
district court's underlying premise that the Policy does not afford coverage here, and its resulting
conclusion that ABK's bad faith claim fails as a matter of law.
For all the reasons discussed above, the district court' s determination that the Policy does
not provide coverage for the Claim was proper. Accordingly, the district court's holding that
ABK' s bad faith claim fails as a matter of law was also appropriate. This Court should affirm the
district court's dismissal with prejudice of ABK' s bad faith claim.

IV. CONCLUSION
Mid-Century respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Memorandum Decision and
Reconsideration Order and affirm the Judgment dismissing ABK's Complaint with prejudice.
DATED this 'l-1~ day of March, 2019.

ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:
Jeff ey A. Thomson
Jaclyn T. Gans, Of the firm
Attorneys for Respondent
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APPENDIX A

Relevant excerpts from Mid-Century Business Owners Special Property Coverage
policy, policy number 0605127565 (R. 72, 80-81, 83) (emphasis added).

•
BUSINESSOWNERS
BP 000212 99

BUSINESSOWNERS SPECIAL
PROPERTY COVERAGE FORM
Various provisions In this policy restrict coverage.
Read the entire policy carefully to determine rights,
duties and what Is and Is not covered.
Throughout this policy the words •you• and •your•
refer to the Named Insured shown In the Declarations. The words "we•, "us• and "our• refer to the
Company providing this Insurance.
Other words and phrases that appear in quotation
marks have special meaning. Refer to Section H Property Definitions.
A. Coverage
We will pay for direct physical loss of or damage
to Covered Property at the premises described
in the Declarations caused by or resulting from
any Covered Cause of Loss.
1. Covered Property
Covered Property, as used in this policy,
means the type or property as described In
this section, A.1., and limited in A.2., Property
Not Covered, If a Limit or Insurance Is shown
in the Declarations for that type of property.
a. Buildings, meaning the buildings and
structures at the premises described In
the Declarations, including:
(1) Completed additions;
(2) Fixtures, Including outdoor fixtures;
(3) Permanently Installed :
(a) Machinery; and
(b) Equipment;
(4) Your personal property In apartments
or rooms furnished by you as landlord;
(5) Personal property owned by you that
Is used to maintain or service the
buildings or structures or the premises, Including:
(a) Fire extinguishing equipment;
(b) Outdoor furniture;

(c) Floor coverings; and
(d) Appliances used for refrigerating,
ventilating, cooking, dishwashlng
or laundering;
(8) If not covered by other insurance:
(a) Additions under construction, alterations and repairs to the buildings
or structures;
(b) Materials, equipment, supplies and
temporary structures, on or within
100 feet of the described premises,
used for making additions, alterations or repairs to the buildings or
structures.
b. Business Personal Property located In or
on the buildings at the described premises
or In the open (or In a vehicle) within 100
feet of the described premises, including:
(1) Property you own that Is used in your
business;
(2) Property of others that Is In your care,
custody or control, except as otherwise
provided In Loss Payment Property
Loss Condition E.6.d.(3)(b);
(3) Tenant' s
Improvements
and
betterments.
Improvements
and
betterments are fixtures, alterations,
installations or additions:
(a) Made a part of the building or
structure you occupy but do not
own; and
(b) You acquired or made at your expense but cannot legally remove;
and
(4) Leased personal property for which
you have a contractual responslblllty
to Insure, unless otherwise provided
for under Paragraph A.1.b.(2).
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(2) This Coverage Extension does not ap•
ply to:
(a) Property held as samples or for
delivery after sale;
(b) Property In storage away from the
premises shown in the 0eclara•
tlons.
(3) The most we will pay under this Coverage Extension for loss or damage to
•valuable papers and records" in any
one occurrence at the described
premises ls $5,000, unless a higher
limit of Insurance for "valuable· papers
and records" ls shown In the Declarations.
For ·valuable papers and records" not
at the described premises, the most
we will pay is $2,500.
(4) Section 8. Exch1alons of this Coverage
Form does not apply to this Coverage
Extension except for:
(a) Paragraph B.1.c., Governmental
Action;
(b) Paragraph B.1.d., Nuclear Hazard;
(c) Paragraph B,1.f,, War And Military
Action;
(d) Paragraph B.2.f., Dishonesty;
(e) Paragraph B.2.g., False Pretense;
(f) Paragraph B.3.; and
(g) The Accounts Receivable and · val-

uable Papers And Records" Exclusions.
f, Accounts Receivable
(1) You may extend the insurance that applies to Business Personal Property to
apply to accounts receivable. We will
pay:
(a) All amounts due from your customers that you are unable to collect;
(b) Interest charges on any loan required to offset amounts you are
unable to collect pending our payment of these amounts;
(c) Collection expenses in excess of
your normal collection expenses
that are made necessary by loss or
damage; and
(d) Other reasonable expenses that
you Incur to re-establish your records of accounts receivable;

BP 000212 99

that result from direct physical loss or
damage by any Covered Cause of Loss
to your records of accounts receivable.
(2) The most we will pay under this Coverage Extension for loss or damage In
any one occurrence at the described
premises Is $5,000, unless a higher
Limit of Insurance for accounts recelvable Is shown in the Declarations.
For accounts receivable not at the described premises, the most we will pay
is $2,500.
(3) Section B, Exclusions of this Coverage
Form does not apply to this Coverage
Extension except for:
(a) Paragraph B.1.c., Governmental
Action;
(b) Paragraph B,1.d,, Nuclear Hazard;
(c) Paragraph B,1.f,, War And Military
Action;
(d) Paragraph B.2.f., Dishonesty;
(e) Paragraph B.2.g., False Pretense;

(f) Paragraph 8.3.; and
(g) The Accounts Receivable and "Val•

uable Papers And Records" Exclusions.

B. Excluslon1
1. We will not pay for loss or damage caused
directly or Indirectly by any of the following.
Such loss or damage is excluded regardless
of any other cause or event that contributes
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.
a. Ordinance Or Law
The enforcement of any ordinance or law:
(1) Regulating the construction, use or repair of any property; or
(2) Requiring the tearing down of any
property, Including the cost of removing Its debris.
This exclusion, Ordinance Or Law, applies
whether the loss results from :
(1) An ordinance or law that is enforced
even If the property has not been
damaged; or
(2) The increased costs Incurred to comply with an ordinance or law in the
course of construction, repair, renovation, remodeling or demolition of
property or removal of its debris, followl ng a physical loss to that property.
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b. Earth Movement

e. Power Failure

(1) Any earth movement (other than
sinkhole collapse), such as an earthquake, landslide, mine subsidence or
earth sinking, rising or shifting. But If
earth movement results In fire or explosion, we will pay for the loss or
damage caused by that fire or explosion.
(2) Volcanic
eruption,
explosion
or
effusion. But if volcanic eruption, explosion or effusion results In fire,
building glass breakage or volcanic
action, we wlll pay for the loss or
damage caused by that fire, building
glass breakage or volcanic action.
Volcanic action means direct loss or
damage resulting from the eruption of
a volcano when the loss or damage is
caused by:
(a) Airborne volcanic blast or alrbome
shock waves;
(b) Ash, dust, or particulate matter; or
(c) Lava flow.

All volcanic eruptions that occur within
any 168-hour period will constitute a
single occurrence.
Volcanic action does not Include the
cost to remove ash, dust or particulate
matter that does not cause direct
physical loss of or damage to Covered
Property.
c. Governmental Action
Seizure or destruction of property by order of governmental authority.
But we will pay for loss or damage caused
by or resulting from acts of destruction
ordered by governmental authority and
taken at the time of a lire to prevent its
spread, if the fire would be covered under
this policy.
d. Nuclear Hazard
Nuclear reaction or radiation, or radioactive contamination, however caused.
But if nuclear reaction or radiation, or radioactive contamination, results In fire, we
will pay for the loss or damage caused by
that fire.

The failure or power or other utility service
supplied to the described premises, however caused, If the failure occurs away
from the described premises.
But if failure of power or other utility service results in a Covered Cause of Loss,
we will pay for the loss or damage caused
by that Covered Cause of Loss.

f. War And Mllltary Action
(1) War, Including undeclared or civil war;
(2) Warlike action by a mllltary force, including action in hindering or defendIng against an actual or expected
attack, by any government, sovereign
or other authority using military personnel or other agents; or
(3) Insurrection,
rebellion,
revolution,
usurped power, or action taken by
governmental authority in hindering or
defending against any of these.
g. Water
(1) Flood, surface water, waves, tides,
tidal waves, overflow of any body of
water, or their spray, all whether
driven by wind or not;
(2) Mudslide or mudflow;

(3) Water that backs up or overflows from
a sewer, drain or sump; or

(4) Water under the ground surface pressing on, or flowing or seeping through:
(a) Foundations, walls, floors or paved
surfaces:
(b) Basements, whether paved or not;
or
(c) Doors, windows or other openings.
But If Water, as described in B.1.g.(1)
through B.1,g,(4), results in fire, explosion or sprinkler leakage, we will pay
for the loss or damage caused by that
fire, explosion or sprinkler leakage.
2, We will not pay for loss or damage caused
by or resulting from any of the following:
a. Electrical Apparatus
Artificially generated electrical current,
including electric arcing, that disturbs
electrical devices, appliances or wires.
But if artificially generated electrical current results in fire, we will pay for the loss
or damage caused by fire.
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(6) Mechanical breakdown, including rupture or bursting caused by centrifugal
force; or
(7) The following causes of loss to personal property:
(a) Dampness or dryness of atmosphere:
(b) Changes In or extremes of temperature; or
(c) Marring or scratching.
But If an excluded cause of loss that Is
listed in 8.2.k,(1) through 8.2.k.(7) results
In a "speclned cause of loss• or building
glass breakage, we will pay for the loss
or damage caused by that #specified
cause of loss# or building glass breakage.
3. We will not pay for loss or damage caused
by or resulting from any of the following 8.3.a.
through B.3.c. Bui If an excluded cause of
loss that is listed in 8.3.a. through 8.3.c. results in a Covered Cause of Loss, we will pay
for the toss or damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss.
a. Weather Conditions
Weather conditions. But this exclusion
only applies if weather conditions contribute In any way with a cause or event excluded in Paragraph 1. above to produce
the loss or damage.
b. Acts Or Decisions

Acts or decisions, Including the fai lure to
act or decide, of any person, group, organization or governmental body.

c. Negligent Work
Faulty, Inadequate or defective:
(1) Planning, zoning, development, surveying, siting;
(2) Design, specifications, workmanship,
repair, construction, renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction;
(3) Materials used In repair, construction,
renovation or remodeling; or
(4) Maintenance;
of part or all of any property on or off the
described premises.
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4. Business Income And Extra Expense Exclusions
We will not pay for:
a. Any Extra Expense, or Increase of Business Income loss, caused by or resulting
from:
(1) Delay in rebuilding, repairing or replacing the property or resuming Noperallons•. due to Interference at the
location of the rebuilding , repair or replacement by strikers or other persons; or
(2) Suspension, lapse or cancellation of
any license, lease or contract. But if
the suspension, lapse or cancellation
Is directly caused by the suspension
of Noperatlons• , we will cover such loss
that affects your Business Income during the "period of restoration •.

b. Any other consequential loss.
5. Accounts Recelvable And "Valuable Papers

And Records" Excluslona
The following additional exclusions apply to
the Accounts Receivable and "Valuable Papers And Records"' Coverage Extensions:
a. We will not pay for loss or damage caused
by or resulting from electrical or magnetic
injury, disturbance or erasure of electronic recordings that Is caused by or results from:
(a) Programming errors or faulty machine Instructions;
(b} Faulty Installation or maintenance
of data processing equipment or
component parts;
But we will pay for direct loss or damage caused by lightning.
b, Applicable to #Valuable Papers and Records" only:
We will not pay for loss or damage caused
by or resulting from any of the following:
(1) Errors or omissions In processing or
copying. But If errors or omissions in
processing or copying result In fire or
explosion, we will pay for the direct
loss or damage caused by the fire or
explosion.
(2) Wear and tear, gradual deterioration
or latent defect.
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